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Civil War, Economic Governance & State
Reconstruction in the Arab Middle East
Steven Heydemann
Abstract: Civil wars currently underway in Libya, Syria, and Yemen demonstrate that patterns of economic governance during violent conflict exhibit significant continuity with prewar practices, raising important questions along three lines. First, violent conflict may disrupt prewar practices less than is often
assumed. Second, continuity in governance highlights the limits of state fragility frameworks for postconflict reconstruction that view violent conflict as creating space for institutional reform. Third, continuity of prewar governance practices has important implications for the relationship between sovereignty, governance, and conflict resolution. Civil wars in the Middle East have not created conditions conducive to reconceptualizing sovereignty or decoupling sovereignty and governance. Rather, parties to conflict
compete to capture and monopolize the benefits that flow from international recognition. Under these conditions, civil wars in the Middle East will not yield easily to negotiated solutions. Moreover, to the extent
that wartime economic orders reflect deeply institutionalized norms and practices, postconflict conditions
will limit possibilities for interventions defined in terms of overcoming state fragility.

If war is the continuation of policy by other means,
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then civil war can be seen as the continuation of governance, not by other means as Carl von Clausewitz
remarked, but by the same means. The civil wars currently underway in Libya, Syria, and Yemen demonstrate that patterns of governance during violent
conflict–the practices used by insurgent and regime forces to maintain order in their areas of control–differ less from prewar practices than might be
expected. In all three of these Middle Eastern cases,
the legacies of prewar governance are especially evident in how regime and insurgent forces construct
wartime economic orders to advance their political
agendas. For both researchers and practitioners, the
persistence of prewar governance practices under
conditions of violent conflict raises important questions, along three distinct but related lines.
© 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00473
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First, it challenges understandings of civil war as marking a rupture in governance:
violent conflict may disrupt prewar practices less than is often assumed. Civil wars may
not, as some have argued, give rise to governance practices that differ sharply from
those present during peacetime. Furthermore, evidence of continuity also calls into
question the extent to which rebel or insurgent forms of governance differ from those
practiced by embattled regimes. The reliance of rebels and regimes on similar modes
of economic governance reduces the likelihood that insurgents will mitigate causes of
violent conflict, such as corruption, predation, or exclusion, or, as some have claimed,
contribute to the development of inclusive,
participatory postconflict political and economic orders.1
Second, continuity between prewar and
wartime practices, especially in the domain
of economic governance, highlights the
limits of state fragility frameworks intended to improve the performance of poorly
governed states. Typically defined as the result of dysfunctional institutions that produce negative social, political, and economic outcomes, fragility is widely believed to
increase the likelihood of violent conflict.
Fragile states are especially vulnerable to internal strains that weak and flawed institutions cannot manage or mitigate.2 Violent
conflicts not only signal the breakdown of
such institutions, but create possibilities for
more effective, inclusive, and accountable
postconflict institutions to emerge.
Fostering the development of such institutions has become a major preoccupation of development and postconflict
practitioners.3 However, the persistence
of prewar norms and practices as well as
the continued reliance of regimes and insurgents alike on prewar institutions during
periods of violent conflict raise significant
questions about the usefulness of fragilitybased frameworks. William Reno has
critically and helpfully assessed fragility147 (1) Winter 2018

based frameworks, yet does so on the as- Steven
sumption that civil war implies state col- Heydemann
lapse.4 Civil wars in the Middle East complicate this starting point. Conflict, in some
cases at least, does far less than is argued in
the literature to weaken prewar norms and
practices that are viewed as causes of fragility. As international affairs scholar Ariel
Ahram has noted: “those interested in state
failure tend to misconstrue or ignore . . . the
feasibility and desirability of repairing state
strength.”5 Civil wars in the Middle East
make clear that violent conflict can deepen the perceived utility of institutions that
were intentionally structured to support
authoritarian, exclusionary, and predatory
systems of rule. Such conditions challenge
the feasibility of approaches to postconflict
reconstruction that reflect the underlying
assumptions of fragility frameworks. Tanja
Börzel and Sonja Grimm have pointed out
that even in cases in which the European
Union, a powerful external actor, intervenes to strengthen institutional effectiveness in its immediate neighborhood, efforts
often fall short.6 Middle East and North Africa (mena) region experiences reinforce
the view that we reconsider just how fragile
the institutions are that generate outcomes
typically associated with fragility, even in
extreme cases such as Libya and Yemen,
where prewar states ranked very highly on
indicators of weakness.
Third, the continuity of prewar practices affects the relationship between sovereignty, governance, and conflict resolution.7 In the Arab Middle East, where state
boundaries are routinely described as artificial, violent conflict is often characterized as the result of failed nation-building
or, in international studies scholar Benjamin Miller’s terms, a sharp incongruence
between “the division of the region into
territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the
region’s peoples.”8 Libya, Syria, and Yemen are all states in which rigid, unitary
49
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conceptions of sovereignty suppressed
the aspirations and identifications of citizens, and played a role in launching national uprisings that evolved from protest
movements into violent conflicts.
In all three cases, protracted conflict has
been accompanied by proposals to redefine
the terms of sovereignty, including various
forms of local autonomy, federalism, decentralization, and even state partition.9 However, civil wars in the Middle East underscore the difficulties that confront attempts
to advance alternative conceptions of state
sovereignty as solutions to violent conflict.
These alternatives often rest on the assumption that governance and sovereignty are
separable. They assume that the relationship between the two can take a variety of
forms. Yet as evidenced by the determination with which warring parties in Libya,
Syria, and Yemen struggle to control state
institutions and state functions, governance
becomes a potent measure of a regime’s sovereign standing. And sovereignty itself is far
too significant a resource to dilute through
political frameworks that would weaken
the power of a central authority to govern.
In keeping with the view expressed by Hendrik Spruyt, unitary, Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty among parties to civil war in the Middle East show few signs of
yielding to formulas that erode the benefits
that international recognition generates for
sovereigns.10
Thus, civil wars in the Middle East have
not created conditions conducive to reconceptualizing sovereignty or decoupling
sovereignty and governance. Rather, they
have been accompanied by the weaponization of sovereignty, with parties to conflict
competing to capture and monopolize the
benefits that flow from international recognition. This process has received significant support, moreover, from the increasing influence in the international system
of authoritarian actors, including Russia,
China, and Iran, who forcefully advocate a

rigid, unitary, centralized, and indivisible
definition of sovereignty. Those who are
recognized internationally as sovereign
thus acquire immediate advantages that
vastly increase the likelihood of their military success and weaken their incentives to
compromise or, in some cases, negotiate.

Continuity between prewar and wartime

practices is visible in how both recognized
authorities and insurgent forces in Libya,
Syria, and Yemen manage the challenges
of economic governance. In all three countries, the descent into civil war has been accompanied not by the breakdown of prewar, authoritarian, criminal, and predatory economic norms and practices, but by
their redeployment to serve wartime requirements. Despite claims that view violent conflict as rupturing prewar practice,
such continuity is not surprising. “Conflict,” as political scientist Paul Staniland
has noted, “does not play out on a blank
slate that actors can make and remake as
they wish. Instead, the past shapes leaders’ options in the present.”11
The past casts an especially long shadow
on the civil wars examined in this essay, in
which the prewar economic institutions
and practices of authoritarian regimes
turned out to be particularly well-suited to
the requirements of insurgent forces. Yet
research literature on civil war as well as
the prevailing practitioner frameworks for
mitigating violent conflict and rebuilding
war-torn societies and economies have not
taken adequate account of the persistence
of authoritarian norms and practices
during civil war. They overlook the implications for how external actors respond
to some acute forms of violent conflict
and misdiagnose the conflict-resolution
strategies that will be needed to end conflict and establish durable peace.
This emphasis on continuity in economic governance in Libya, Syria, and Yemen is
not to suggest that economies are indiffer-
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ent to conflict, or did not undergo meaningful change as violence escalated and civil war took hold. In all three cases, national
markets have been destroyed by war and replaced by patchworks of fragmented, highly localized markets that are nonetheless integrated into translocal networks of trade
and exchange, including trade between
adversaries across conflict lines.12 Patterns
of international trade have been sharply altered by war. So have overall levels of economic productivity and output. In all three
countries, manufacturing and agricultural
sectors have been devastated and oil production and exports have declined sharply, while control over natural resources and
predatory opportunities (smuggling, extortion, human trafficking) generate intense
conflict between opposing factions.13
Moreover, continuity at the level of practices does not imply continuity in the composition or configuration of economic actors. What is evident, however, from the
experiences of all three countries is that
the economic norms and practices developed by authoritarian regimes before war
persist during conflict and affect both how
conflicts end and how postconflict political economies are organized. In all three
cases, informal economic institutions resemble those described by Reno and Vanda
Felbab-Brown: they were pervasive and
personalistic, often exerting more influence over economic outcomes than formal
state institutions and economic policies.14
In all three, prewar economic norms and
practices included a culture of impunity
for privileged economic actors, predatory
and coercive forms of resource extraction,
porous boundaries between formal and informal economic activity and between licit and illicit practices, as well as dispersed,
diffuse frameworks of economic authority in which state functions such as regulation and service provision were delegated
to nonstate agents.15 In all three, economic
governance was organized not to ensure the
147 (1) Winter 2018

provision of public goods to all citizens, but Steven
to control and allocate access to what can Heydemann
only be described as semipublic goods to select categories of citizens, typically on the
basis of ascriptive criteria.16 These economic norms and practices were accompanied
by social norms, institutions, and political
practices that further eroded the distinction
between prewar and wartime conditions,
including decentralization of control over
the means of violence and delegation (or de
facto privatization) of the authority to tax
and extract resources from citizens.17

Evidence of continuity in economic gov-

ernance has significant implications along
several dimensions. It matters for how we
think about the relationship between states
and insurgent movements, how insurgencies are organized and sustain themselves,
and the challenges that confront postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. Three
such dimensions are explored in this essay.
First, such evidence calls into question a
foundational assumption of research literature on rebel governance and on the political economy of civil war: that state-based
forms of economic governance are distinct
from those constructed by insurgents, and
that conflict economies exhibit unique attributes that differentiate them from prewar conditions of economic “normalcy.”
According to international affairs scholars
Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman,
Recent scholarship has identified several features unique to the economies of civil war:
they are parasitic, because they are dominated
by rent-seeking and the extraction and trade
of primary products, rather than by value
adding economic activities; they are illicit,
insofar as they depend heavily on black and
gray markets that operate outside and at the
expense of legal and formal economic activity of the state; and they are predatory–that is,
they are based on the deliberate and systematic use of violence to acquire assets, control
trade, and exploit labor.18
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This attempt to draw sharp distinctions
between civil war economies that exhibit “unique features” and prewar economies that engage in “value adding economic activities” is difficult to sustain given how prewar political economies were
organized in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. In
all three, the authoritarian economic orders that existed prior to the onset of civil war–arrangements that government
scholar Daniel Brumberg describes as “protection rackets”–undermine the claim that
violent conflicts are the cause of predation,
rent-seeking, and a disregard for the longterm requirements of economic and social development in what were previously
well-governed economies.19
Not only do wartime economic orders in
Libya, Syria, and Yemen exhibit significant
continuity with prewar practices, they also
display striking similarities across areas of
each country held by regime or opposition
forces. To be sure, there are notable differences between the wartime economic orders that have emerged in areas under the
control of regimes or recognized authorities
and those in rebel-held territories.20 Not
least, regimes benefit from their standing
as recognized sovereign authorities, with
all the advantages this confers.21 In many
important respects, however, civil war in
Syria, Libya, and Yemen has amplified and
expanded the economic logics and practices that were commonplace before 2011.
These legacy effects flowing from the political economies of prewar authoritarian regimes highlight the extent to which wartime economic orders are influenced by and
sustain prewar economic practices, none of
which reflected the conditions of advanced
capitalist economies, in which the rule of
law functions, formal institutions of economic governance are relevant, and elements of accountability are present.
Instead, prewar Libya, Syria, and Yemen
can best be defined as corrupt, predatory,
and crony capitalist political economies

with low accountability and transparency
and weak rule of law. In all three, as in other authoritarian regimes in the mena region, the political requirements of regime
survival trumped concerns with economic
and social development.22 State elites engaged routinely in illicit practices to enrich themselves at public expense. Criminal economic networks were tightly integrated into and operated as prominent
features of state-regime-business relations
among civilian elites and their bureaucratic
and military counterparts, who often controlled significant business interests in their
own right.23 Economic policy, anchored in
long-term mistrust of the private sector by
regimes, was designed to make private economic activity legible to, controllable by,
and subject to the predatory intervention
of state authorities.
These prewar economic practices influenced how wartime economic orders would
take shape once protest movements collapsed into violent conflict. In each case,
prewar systems of economic governance
socialized citizens into economic norms
and behaviors that supported antiregime
mobilization. Over time, citizens honed
economic skills, knowledge, and capacities that helped launch and sustain antiregime protests. These included how to conceal economic resources and activities from
state authorities, and a reliance on clandestine, formally illicit modes of exchange organized through informal networks based
on family, kin, or other ascriptive ties that
are difficult for outsiders to penetrate.
From 2011 onward, informal networks
facilitated clandestine strategies of popular
mobilization for antiregime protests as violence escalated.24 They also proved highly
adaptive in the development of formal and
informal insurgent funding networks that
linked armed opposition groups in Syria
to the governments and populations of Gulf
Cooperation Council states. The clandestine and networked character of Syria’s
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prewar economy also enabled communications flows, enhanced trust among participants in the uprising, and eased bargaining and negotiations among adversaries and competitors that have mitigated the
economic effects of war. Adversaries have
negotiated agreements to distribute power and water supplies across conflict lines
and buy and sell oil, wheat, and other essential goods–such as vegetables from Idlib to
Deir al-Zour in Syria–across territory controlled by competing armed groups.25
After more than six years of conflict, the
informal economic networks that the Assad regime cultivated through local agents,
extending opportunities for private profit through tolerated illicit activities in exchange for loyalty and service as regime enforcers, had not only endured, but had also
emerged as central to the dispersed strategy of control and coercion that grew stronger as the Syrian state and regime contracted. The most detailed study available of the
transformation of regime-linked criminal
networks into loyalist militias that acquire
semiformal status, even while they benefit
from significant autonomy and have enormous influence over economic and political affairs in their areas of operation, provides compelling evidence of this metamorphosis.26 Such arrangements give the
regime flexibility in deploying highly decentralized networks of local warlords to
enforce its authority and extract resources from local populations.27
As in any conflict zone, these conditions
produced opportunities for profit alongside
the vast destruction the war has wrought.
These have emerged, in part, through competition between the regime and opposition
for access to scarce commodities, including
wheat and oil. According to accounts of officials, the regime has been able to outbid
the opposition. In doing so, it has created
incentives for new networks of mediators
to emerge who broker the transfer of goods
across conflict lines.28
147 (1) Winter 2018

Economic opportunities have also aris- Steven
en in the trafficking of the vast quantities Heydemann
of goods looted from the homes of those
displaced by war, and by exploiting prewar
illicit trading networks to meet the needs
that conflict has created.29 Researchers at
the London School of Economics, for example, have identified a vibrant market in automobiles that sprang up in Deraa in Southern Syria near the Jordanian border–an
area known before the war for its extensive
smuggling networks.30 In the north of the
country, Syrian-Turkish trade is believed
to have returned to prewar levels, through
both formal trade channels and extensive
informal, illicit trade networks that have
thrived despite the militarization of the border and its periodic closure by Turkey.31 The
Syrian-Lebanese border zone has provided
similar opportunities for trade, smuggling,
refugee flows, and support operations for
insurgent armed groups, exploiting wellestablished (and often regime-supported)
illicit trading networks.
Similar evidence of continuity, linkages between state and nonstate actors, the
blending of legal and criminal activities,
and the utility of prewar economic practices during episodes of violent conflict are all
evident in the resurgence of human trafficking networks in Libya. Along a key transit
route into Southern Europe, loyalist tribal networks closely linked to the Gaddafi
regime were implicated in the rise of human trafficking that Libya experienced in
the 2000s. In 2008, the Libyan government
agreed to clamp down on trafficking in exchange for financial assistance from the
Berlusconi government in Italy. A leading
European think tank described the trafficking activity during this period as “a criminal activity conducted by specific organisations in connection with the formal state
institutions.”32 When the Gaddafi regime
was overthrown in 2011, human trafficking
surged once again. Yet in the regime’s absence, illicit trafficking became more high53
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ly decentralized, with multiple competing
smuggling networks–linked to warring
factions in Libya’s civil war–battling for
control over key routes.33 As Gaddafi’s loyalists lost their privileged access to a broad
range of predatory activities, nearly all parties to the Libyan conflict engaged in racketeering, the “protection” of trade, and other forms of extortion to generate the revenue needed to sustain their participation
in conflict.
Yemen also exhibits persistent patterns
of predatory and illicit practices by state
and nonstate actors that have proven to be
highly functional in sustaining violent conflict. As in Syria and Libya, such practices
are widespread, including within the recognized government led by President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. They involve combinations of cooperation and competition
among actors across conflict lines, linkages
between state and nonstate actors, blending of licit and illicit activities, and the mobilization of cross-cutting economic networks that emerged during prewar periods
and complicate efforts to map specific activities by tribe, region, or sect. For example, classified U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks include an assessment
from May 2005 from the U.S. Embassy in
Sana’a noting direct participation by a powerful Yemeni general, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar–who defected from the government
of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh in
early 2011 and was appointed deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces in January 2016 under President Hadi–in a vast
smuggling enterprise.34 Mohsen’s illicit but
sanctioned activities extended across the
country, were supported and sustained by
several units of the armed forces, and relied
on collaboration from wide-ranging networks of actors, including tribes formally
identified as regime adversaries. While notable for its scale and scope, the predatory
frameworks that Mohsen exploited were
widespread in prewar Yemen.

The escalation of violence in Yemen in
mid-2014, following the collapse of a National Dialogue process intended to chart
the country’s transition to a more inclusive, participatory form of rule, amplified
the role of these prewar economic practices. According to Freedom House, the “network of corruption and patronage established under Saleh remained entrenched
in public institutions.”35 As violence shattered Yemen’s fragile economy, with fragmented state institutions, massive levels
of food insecurity, and more than two million Yemenis displaced, illicit, predatory
economic practices have grown in importance. Armed factions, including Houthi
forces as well as those associated with the
recognized government, are deeply implicated in the smuggling of weapons, food,
and pharmaceuticals, as well as human
trafficking. Indeed, trafficking networks
that previously moved migrants from the
Horn of Africa across Yemen and into Saudi Arabia–flows that continue in the midst
of conflict–have diversified and now also
move Yemenis who can afford to leave to
the Horn of Africa.36
In none of the three cases explored here
has conflict led to a significant shift in prewar practices of economic governance. Instead, practices evident in all three before
the most recent outbreaks of violence have
persisted, providing parties to the conflict–
especially those associated with internationally recognized sovereign authorities–
with the means to sustain their military activities. Middle Eastern cases undermine
claims that violent conflicts cause a rupture
with prewar economic practices, and that
they give rise to political economies that exhibit attributes that are unique in being parasitic, illicit, and predatory. Based on evidence from Syria, Libya, and Yemen, such
claims are simply untenable.

The continuity of economic practices also
has important implications for postconflict
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reconstruction. Simply put, whether civil
war ends in a negotiated settlement or military victory, local actors have few incentives
to give up wartime economic orders. These
economic orders took shape before the onset of conflict, helped make it possible for
local actors to sustain military operations,
delivered significant benefits to designated sovereigns, and created new categories
of actors with a stake in their perpetuation. These factors complicate approaches to postconflict reconstruction that link
the onset of civil war to state fragility, and
find the remedy to fragility in the development of state institutions that possess attributes of high-quality governance, but
threaten the power and wealth of leading
actors. In addition, in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as in many other predatory, authoritarian regimes, the institutional arrangements associated with state fragility are not
the failed outcomes of state-building processes that sought, but fell short of achieving, inclusive, participatory, and developmentally effective forms of governance.
Rather, in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi,
in Syria under Hafez al-Assad and Bashar
al-Assad, and in Yemen under Ali Abdullah
Saleh, state-building reflected the strategic
choices of incumbents who designed governance institutions to express exclusionary, repressive, and predatory preferences.
The state institutions that resulted from
such processes did not lack capacity, nor
were they fragile. They provided incumbents with the organizational means to
construct durable, repressive-exclusionary
systems of rule, appropriate resources and
redistribute them through mechanisms
that privileged regime loyalists, and consolidate social pacts between regimes and
select categories of citizens.37 Conflict is
indeed an indicator of regime dysfunction,
and the limits of the economic and political orders on which they rest. Yet if the
Middle East is any example, these indicators have not been read as signals of the
147 (1) Winter 2018

need for reform, either by incumbents or Steven
Heydemann
by most challengers.
When the mass protests of 2011 led to
armed insurgencies and civil war in these
three cases, insurgent forces appropriated
and adapted prewar institutions of economic governance. In their struggles for control of the state, powerful insurgent movements–including Ansar al-Sharia in Libya,
the Houthi movement in Yemen, and Ahrar
al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the
Islamic State in Syria–reproduced the authoritarian characteristics associated with
state fragility: exclusion, predation, corruption, illegality, and informality. When
the Assad regime relinquished authority in
Northeast Syria in 2012 to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (pyd), the pyd immediately “replicated past regime behavior, focusing on maintaining a secure hold of this
strategic geographical area at the expense of
effective governance.”38 Thus, violent conflict in Syria, Libya, and Yemen has not, as
political economist Leonard Wantchekon
has argued, “annihilated the authoritarian
political situation that led to war,” thereby
creating possibilities for political and economic reconstruction along more inclusive and participatory lines.39 Unlike cases
in which wartime governance is linked to
processes of democratization, in these three
cases, it has tended to reproduce prewar, authoritarian norms and practices of economic governance.40
One example of this phenomenon from
each of the cases explored in this essay
should suffice to make the point. In September 2014, an assessment on Yemen published by the Atlantic Council expressed
concern that key political actors were reproducing pre-uprising patterns of governance:
Instead of reshaping the political order to
bring in new political voices, address corruption, and introduce responsive and accountable governance, partisan interests
have largely paralyzed the transitional gov-
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One aspect of the hydrocarbon dispute is a
challenge to the centralised model of political and economic governance developed
around oil and gas resources that was crucial to the old regime’s power. But corruption that greased patronage networks was at
that model’s centre, and corrupt energy sector practices have increased.42

With neither regimes nor insurgents
committed to economic inclusion, transparency, or accountability, postconflict
processes of economic reconstruction that
draw on recommendations from the state
fragility literature are unlikely to succeed.
Civil wars in the Middle East highlight the
chasm that divides the assumptions underlying fragility-based strategies of conflict
resolution from the realities of conflict dynamics. Where local actors view existing institutions as critical for their survival, where
incentives to endorse processes of institutional reform are weak, where international actors themselves exhibit little commitment to good governance, fragility-based
frameworks face insurmountable obstacles.

In the Syrian case, in which prewar state
institutions were more developed and
have experienced less degradation than in
Yemen or Libya, we find even more robust
patterns of institutional continuity and the
persistence of the corrupt, predatory attributes described above, attributes mirrored
in many instances in the governance institutions created by the opposition.43 As in
Libya and Yemen, conflict has narrowed,
rather than expanded, opportunities for
the reform of state practices.44
From a fragility perspective, these regime
adaptations to wartime conditions have
consequences that are not only counterproductive, but undermine the capacity of
external actors to uphold their own standards of accountability, legality, and transparency. In 2016, for example, researchers and journalists brought to light the
extent to which un humanitarian assistance programs in Syria had become complicit in the corrupt and predatory norms
that define the regime’s economic governance.45 Rather than an international institution moving a “fragile state” toward
norms of good governance, its intervention instead corrupted its own operating
norms and practices.

ernance from prewar to wartime conditions
also highlights how tightly civil war has
linked sovereignty and governance in the
Middle East, reducing prospects for political settlements that envision a decoupling
of the two. In the recent literature on sovereignty, limited statehood, and governance,
researchers have identified a wide range
of nonstate governance frameworks that
emerge in which the domestic sovereignty
of states is weak or entirely absent.46 These
frameworks are often presented as expanding opportunities for state-based, nonstate,
and external actors to “share sovereignty,”
address deficits in the provision of public
goods, and resolve violent conflicts.47 Yet
the civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen
have pushed in the opposite direction, narrowing opportunities for flexible conceptions of sovereignty to take hold and giving
recognized authorities incentives to sustain
prewar governance practices.
By any measure, these three cases reflect
the attributes of limited statehood. In all
three, nonstate actors have become centrally involved in critical aspects of economic governance, and recognized authorities have themselves cultivated vast semi-

ernment, perpetuating the elite-dominated
politics of old Sana’a and its tribal allies.41

In December 2015, the International Crisis Group warned that revolution and the
overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya
had done little to alter the political economy of natural resource management in the
country:

Continuity in patterns of economic gov-
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autonomous, nonstate economic networks
to extract revenue from war-torn and fragmented economies. Nonetheless, civil war
in the Middle East has also increased the
significance regimes and insurgents attach
to unitary, Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty. It has reinforced the imperative of
sovereignty as a weapon that can be wielded against challengers, or used to buttress
the political, diplomatic, and economic resources to which a recognized authority has
access. Even as the functions of economic governance diffuse and dissipate beyond
the direct control of states, recognized authorities aggressively assert their economic authority and their exclusive right to undertake the economic functions that legitimate their standing as sovereign. Economic
governance as an expression of sovereignty
not only constrains possibilities for reallocating economic functions as part of a political settlement, it rewards recognized authorities that behave as if they possess the
economic sovereignty they claim, and hold
fast to rigid, centralized control over economic governance.
Thus, sovereignty is fiercely defended in
Libya, Syria, and Yemen by regimes that
claim the legitimacy and authority, as well
as the legal protections and prerogatives,
associated with international recognition.
In all three cases, as in many authoritarian regimes, recognized governments invest heavily in domestic institutions that affirm their standing as sovereign, including
courts and constitutions.48 They staunchly
defend their claims to sovereignty in their
relations with external actors and exploit
such claims to extract resources from the
international system. They legitimate foreign military interventions–by both state
and nonstate actors–as entitlements of
sovereignty. In all three cases, moreover,
internationally recognized authorities legitimate their standing in part through their
capacity to perform the economic governance functions associated with Westpha147 (1) Winter 2018

lian sovereignty.49 They maintain central Steven
banks, issue economic regulations, sign Heydemann
contracts with other states, invest in public works, take on sovereign debt, pay salaries to public-sector employees, even in areas controlled by insurgents, and insist on
their prerogative to tax.
To be sure, the intensity with which recognized authorities pursue the roles and
functions of statehood and governmentality bear little resemblance to the reality of
fragmented, contested, and dispersed economic control in all three countries. In none
of the three do recognized governments
possess the domestic attributes associated
with sovereignty: they lack exclusive control over territory, populations, and natural
resources; they do not possess a monopoly
over the legitimate use of violence; and they
do not exercise legal or economic authority throughout the prewar borders of the
state.50 In all three cases, processes of economic fragmentation have been accelerated
by regimes that have actively delegated sovereign functions of economic governance
to a variety of nonstate and external actors.
Moreover, rebel movements have adopted
the economic norms and practices of the regimes they seek to displace, deepening the
fragmentation of national economies.
As wartime economic orders take hold
and fragmented, “translocal” markets become consolidated, the prospects for reestablishing central governments that possess the attributes of economic sovereignty
are diminished. Yet this has not tempered
the drive for control over formal economic governance by recognized authorities, or
made them more responsive to proposals
for economic decentralization. In the Yemeni case, for example, regime and insurgent actors compete for control over national financial institutions, splintering
authority over the central bank and government ministries. In Libya, warring parties
have struggled to assert their authority over
the country’s most significant economic
57
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institution, the National Oil Company, and
to control the “oil crescent,” in which oil
production is concentrated. In early 2017,
forces associated with General Khalifa
Haftar, who opposes the internationally
recognized Government of National Accord (gna) based in Tripoli, seized control
of the region. Reflecting the dire implications of this move for Libya’s recognized
government, Haftar’s actions provoked
sharp criticism from the un and Western
governments for undermining the sovereignty of the gna. General Haftar, meanwhile, cultivated support from Russia to
enhance his own claims to sovereign authority, using the control of Libya’s oil-producing areas by his forces to strengthen his
bid for international recognition.
In contrast, moderate opposition forces in Syria declined to establish “national”
institutions of economic governance challenging those of the Assad regime. Such a
course, they argued, would only encourage external actors to seek the partition of
the country–an outcome that Syria’s experience of colonial rule placed beyond the
scope of legitimate possibilities. Instead,
highly localized wartime economic orders
have emerged, with controlling militias exerting significant authority over economic
activities in a given area, relying on a familiar repertoire of informal, illicit economic
practices to generate revenue. The Islamic State, however, explicitly mimicked the
economic forms of a modern state to bolster its claims to sovereignty as an Islamic
caliphate, even while engaging in predatory
and criminal practices of economic governance that resembled those of regimes and
rebels alike.
Indeed, rebel-controlled local economies have proliferated in all three countries, as armed groups imposed their authority over economic activities in areas
under their control and adopted combinations of coercion, criminality, and cooperation with local populations to extract the

revenues needed to sustain themselves in
power and continue to wage war.
These trends hold significant implications for the relationship between governance, limited statehood, and sovereignty.
On the one hand, the tenuousness of domestic sovereignty in all three of the civil wars examined here has amplified and
hardened the determination of recognized authorities to defend their sovereign
standing. It reinforces their refusal to contemplate alternatives to a rigid, unitary,
and centralized conception of sovereignty. It also drives continuity in prewar governance practices, especially with respect
to economic governance, which becomes
a marker of their capacity to fulfill their
responsibilities as sovereign and fend off
competing claims from rivals. On the other
hand, the sovereign standing of recognized
authorities also empowers them to engage
with impunity in a wide range of illicit, corrupt, and predatory economic practices, devolve authority over economic governance
to nonstate actors, and otherwise exploit
limited statehood to their own advantage.
Thus, under wartime conditions, governance, sovereignty, and limited statehood
become more tightly coupled. Civil wars in
the Middle East offer few prospects for strategies of conflict resolution that rest on decoupling governance and sovereignty, or on
the acceptance of flexible, plural, decentralized conceptions of sovereignty. In all three
of the cases, proposals have been advanced,
calling for various forms of decentralization, federalism, or local autonomy within existing state borders, and for powersharing arrangements at the national level.
Yet in each of these cases, leading political
actors on all sides have rejected such proposals as threats to the integrity and sovereignty of the nation, or as conspiratorial attempts by imperial powers to redraw state
boundaries or partition and thus weaken
Arab states. In the Syrian case, for example,
the Assad regime, the opposition Syrian Na-
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tional Coalition, and the opposition Higher Negotiation Committee have all rejected
proposals for political arrangements that
they believe would compromise the sovereignty and integrity of the Syrian state. In
all three cases, sovereignty claims empower external spoilers, embolden recognized
governments and insurgents to adopt hardline positions, and encourage political actors to prefer military solutions to political
compromises in resolving violent conflicts.

Across the Arab Middle East, violent con-

flicts have wreaked unfathomable damage,
bringing levels of death, destruction, and
displacement not seen since World War II.
Their effects will be felt for generations.
For scholars, officials, and practitioners,
moreover, the region’s civil wars pose significant challenges. They test the limits of
current practice in postconflict reconstruction. They also test the limits of key findings in the research literature on civil war. In
three major respects, civil wars in the Middle East call into question assumptions that
have shaped theory and practice concerning
the political economy of civil wars, on one
hand, and the options available for building
pathways out of conflict and toward postconflict reconstruction and social repair, on
the other hand. All three challenges to conventional wisdom flow from observed continuities in governance norms and practices
between prewar and wartime conditions.
First, the experience of violent conflict in
the Middle East suggests that civil war does
not mark a rupture or breakdown of prewar
practices of economic governance. Nor can
we view rebel economic governance as exhibiting attributes that distinguish it from
those of regimes. Rather, conflict is marked
by high levels of continuity between prewar
and wartime practices of economic governance, with high levels of similarity in the
behavior of both regimes and insurgents.
Second, the continuity of governance
practices between prewar and wartime con147 (1) Winter 2018

ditions weakens the claims of practitioners Steven
who embrace the notion of state fragility, Heydemann
view conflict as signaling the breakdown of
a prewar institutional order, and link prospects for postwar reconstruction to reforms
designed to endow postwar institutions
with the capacities associated with idealized notions of good governance (transparency, inclusion, accountability, and participation). Civil wars in the Middle East
highlight how remote and implausible such
notions are as guides to feasible strategies
for ending violent conflict. They also underscore the robustness of prewar institutional arrangements, and the extent to which
they are seen as assets by warring parties.
Third, continuity in governance practices sheds light on the limits of efforts to
treat governance and sovereignty as separable or loosely coupled under conditions
of limited statehood. It calls attention to
the imperative that recognized authorities face to assert and defend a rigid, unitary, and Westphalian conception of sovereignty, and the extent to which continuity
in the provision of governance becomes a
marker of sovereignty. Under such conditions, there is little reason to be optimistic
about peace-building strategies that would
require recognized authorities to compromise their claims to sovereignty.
This analysis of the implications of continuity in prewar and wartime governance
practices in three civil wars currently underway in the Middle East leads to sobering
conclusions. Governance practices institutionalized by authoritarian regimes prior to
conflict have proven decisive in shaping important wartime behaviors of regimes and
insurgents in all three cases. Degrees of continuity vary in ways yet to be explored. With
respect to economic governance in particular, however, the emergence of wartime
economic orders has produced similar governance strategies across conflict lines, with
armed actors relying heavily on coercion,
predation, criminality, the selective allo59
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cation of public goods, and the dispersion
of sovereign economic functions to external and nonstate actors. Under these conditions, we should anticipate that civil wars
in the Middle East will not yield easily to
negotiated solutions. We should also expect that the eventual outcomes of conflict are unlikely to produce durable peace,
political stability, or economic well-being
for citizens. In addition, the extent to which
repressive and exclusionary wartime economic orders reflect institutionalized economic norms and practices, and have empowered armed actors whose interests
are served by the continuation of conflict,
make these cases poor candidates for external interventions defined in terms of overcoming state fragility. They are also likely

to feature the abuse of sovereignty norms
to exacerbate maximalist claims by regimes
and insurgent challengers alike.
Pathways out of civil war in such cases
are particularly elusive. They are likely to
require diplomatic, financial, and military
strategies that create incentives for embattled regimes and insurgent challengers to
end violence and accept meaningful compromises in the interest of securing their
minimal requirements, and these may well
include the absence of transitional justice
and accountability for perpetrators, as well
as power-sharing arrangements that accommodate all warring parties to differing
degrees. As violent conflicts in Libya, Syria,
and Yemen rage on, however, such outcomes still appear stubbornly out of reach.

endnotes

60

1

Didier Péclard and Delphine Mechoulan, “Rebel Governance and the Politics of Civil War,”
Working Paper (Basel, Switzerland: Swiss Peace Foundation, 2015).

2

U.S. Agency for International Development, Measuring Fragility: Indicators and Methods for Rating State Performance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005);
and Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2003).

3

Michael Woolcock, “Engaging with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: An Alternative Approach to Theory, Measurement and Practice,” Working Paper No. 286 (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2014); and William J. Burns, Michèle Flournoy,
and Nancy Lindborg, U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility (Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace, 2016).

4

William Reno, “Fictional States & Atomized Public Spheres: A Non-Western Approach to
Fragility,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017).

5

Ariel Ahram, “Learning to Live with Militias: Toward a Critical Policy on State Failure,” Journal
of Intervention and State Building 5 (2) (2011): 179.

6

Tanja A. Börzel and Sonja Grimm, “Building Good (Enough) Governance in Postconflict Societies & Areas of Limited Statehood: The European Union & the Western Balkans,” Dædalus
147 (1) (Winter 2017).

7

This theme is addressed by several other authors in this issue of Dædalus. See also Thomas Risse,
ed., Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011); and Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999).

8

Benjamin Miller, “Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East
War-Propensity,” Security Studies 15 (4) (2006): 658–705.

9

Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” World Politics 52 (4) (2000): 437–483; Chaim Kaufmann “When All Else
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” International Se- Steven
curity 23 (2) (1998): 129–156; and Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “What’s Heydemann
in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?” International Security 34 (2) (2009): 82–118.
10

Hendrik Spruyt, “Civil Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System,” Dædalus 146
(4) (Fall 2017).

11

Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 2014), 218.

12

Wolfram Lacher, “Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market,” in Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional
Expansion, International Alliances, ed. Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015), 31–50.

13

International Crisis Group, The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s Energy Wealth, Middle East and North Africa Report No. 165 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015).

14

Reno, “Fictional States & Atomized Public Spheres”; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Organized
Crime, Illicit Economies, Civil Violence & International Order: More Complex Than You
Think,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017).

15

Masha Hedberg, “Top-Down Self-Organization: State Logics, Substitutional Delegation, and
Private Governance in Russia,” Governance 29 (1) (2016): 67–83; and Béatrice Hibou, The Force
of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

16

April Alley, “The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen,” Middle East Journal 64 (3) (2010): 385–409; and Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State Building
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

17

Ariel Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011); Adnan Naseemullah, “Shades of Sovereignty: Explaining Political Order and Disorder in Pakistan’s Northwest,” Studies in Comparative International Development 49 (4) (2014): 501–522; and Janet Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic
Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

18

Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed
and Grievance (Boulder, Colo.: Lyne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2–3 (emphasis mine).

19

Daniel Brumberg, “Transforming the Arab World’s Protection-Racket Politics,” Journal of Democracy 24 (3) (2013): 88–103.

20

Zachariah C. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2011).

21

Nelson Kasfir, “Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: Causes of Failure,”
in Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences.

22

Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,” The Saban Center
for Middle East Policy Analysis Paper No. 14 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
2007).

23

Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012).

24

Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydemann, “Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and
Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers,” Mediterranean Politics 17 (2) (2012): 139–159.

25

The People Demand Change interview with Qutaiba Idlibi, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2016.

26

Cody Roche, “Assad Regime Militias and Shi’ite Jihadis in the Syrian Civil War,” BellingCat, November 30, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/11/30/assad-regime
-militias-and-shiite-jihadis-in-the-syrian-civil-war/; and Raja Abdulrahim, “In Syria, Patchwork of Forces Control Regime-Held Areas,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2017, https://www
.wsj.com/articles/in-syria-patchwork-of-forces-control-regime-held-areas-1488882600.

147 (1) Winter 2018

61

Civil War, 27 Tobias Schneider, “The Decay of the Syrian Regime is Much Worse than You Think,” War
Economic
On The Rocks, August 31, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/the-decay-of-the-syrian
Governance &
-regime-is-much-worse-than-you-think/.
State Recon28
Hamad al-Mahmoud, “The War Economy in the Syrian Conflict: The Government’s Handsstruction in the
Arab Middle
Off Tactics,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 15, 2015, http://carnegie
East
endowment.org/2015/12/15/war-economy-in-syrian-conflict-government-s-hands-off-tactics

-pub-62202.

62

29

Erika Solomon, “Syria Crisis: In Homs ‘Sunni Markets’ Sell Looted Goods,” Reuters, June 19,
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/homs-sunni-markets_n_1608009?utm_hpref=tw.

30

Rim Turkmani, Ali A. K. Ali, Mary Kaldor, and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Countering the Logic
of the War Economy in Syria: Evidence from Three Local Areas (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015), http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/08/Countering-war-economy-Syria2.pdf.

31

Omer Karasapan, “The Impact of Syrian Businesses in Turkey,” The Brookings Institution,
March 16, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/03/16/the-impact
-of-syrian-businesses-in-turkey/.

32

Mattia Toaldo, “Migrations through and from Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge,” Working
Paper 15/14 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2015), 3.

33

Atlantic Council interview with Karim Mezran, Washington, D.C., January 12, 2017.

34

U.S. Embassy Sana’a, “royg Insiders Increasingly Frustrated with Saleh Clan,” Wikileaks Cable:
05sanaa1352_a, May 23, 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05SANAA1352_a.html.

35

Freedom House, “Freedom in the World: Yemen,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom
-world/2016/yemen.

36

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Yemen Situation: Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015), http://reporting
.unhcr.org/node/9982.

37

Steven Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,”
in Debating Arab Authoritarianism, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), 22–38; and Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, eds., Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 2013).

38

Kheder Khaddour, How Regional Security Concerns Uniquely Constrain Governance in Northeast Syria
(Beirut: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 1, http://carnegieendowment
.org/files/CMEC_66_Khaddour_Jazira_FInal_Web.pdf.

39

Leonard Wantchekon, “The Paradox of ‘Warlord’ Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation,”
American Political Science Review 98 (1) (2004): 18.

40

Reyko Huang, The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

41

Danya Greenfield and Svetlana Milbert, “Protests in Yemen Expose Weak Governance and Poor
Economic Planning,” Atlantic Council, September 2, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
menasource/protests-in-yemen-expose-weak-governance-and-poor-economic-planning.

42

International Crisis Group, The Prize.

43

Schneider, “The Decay of the Syrian Regime is Much Worse Than You Think.”

44

Steven Heydemann, “Tracking the Arab Spring: Syria and Arab Authoritarianism,” Journal of
Democracy 24 (4) (2013): 59–73.

45

Nick Hopkins and Emma Beals, “un Pays Tens of Millions to Assad Regime under Syria Aid
Programme,” The Guardian, August 29, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
aug/29/un-pays-tens-of-millions-to-assad-regime-syria-aid-programme-contracts.
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

46

Risse, Governance without a State?

47

Aila M. Matanock, “Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute
for Limited Statehood,” Governance 27 (4) (2014): 589–612; and Stephen Krasner and Thomas
Risse, “External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood:
Introduction,” Governance 27 (4) (2014): 545–567.

48

Reinoud Leenders, “Prosecuting Political Dissent Courts and the Resilience of Authoritarianism in Syria,” in Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in
Syria and Iran, ed. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013), 169–199; and Tom Ginsberg and Alberto Simpser, eds., Constitutions in
Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

49

Thomas Risse, “Governance under Limited Sovereignty,” in Back to Basics: State Power in the
Contemporary World, ed. Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 78–104.

50

Krasner, Sovereignty.

147 (1) Winter 2018

Steven
Heydemann

63

Copyright of Daedalus is the property of MIT Press and its content may not be copied or
emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

